法意PHIGROUP

Feb 26th 2009
From The Economist print edition

Where could emerging-market contagion spread next? 新興市場下一步將會傳到哪？

THE drought of foreign capital is beginning to wreck many economies in central and eastern Europe. Currencies, shares and bonds are tumbling, and some economists fear that one or more of these countries could default on its foreign debts. Emerging-market crises have a nasty habit of spreading as investors flee one country after another. Some Middle Eastern markets, notably Dubai, are already in trouble. But which of the larger emerging economies are most vulnerable?

外國資本的缺乏正在開始毀滅中歐和東歐的經濟。貨幣，股票和債券也接連受挫，一些經濟學家擔心這些國家中會有一個甚至更多的拖欠外債。新型市場的危機就是有種普遍的糟糕情況就是投資者從一個國家逃竄到另一個國家。一些中歐市場，明顯迪拜就已經陷入困境。但是哪個更大的新型經濟是最脆弱的？

To answer that question in the past, economists used to pay most attention to the solvency of governments, and hence their debt-to-GDP ratios. But today, the biggest risk in the emerging world comes not from sovereign borrowing, but from the debts of firms and banks. As foreign capital dries up, they will find it harder to refinance maturing debts or to raise new loans.

在過去為了回答這個問題，經濟學往往關注政府的償付能力，因而歸咎於債務與國內生產總值的比率。但是今天，在新型世界裡，最大的風險不是來自於國家的借款，而是來自於企業和銀行的債務。由於外國資本的乾涸，他們發現為到期債務籌集資金或是獲得新的貸款將更加困難。






Our table (based largely on figures provided by HSBC) uses three indicators to judge how vulnerable economies are to the global credit crunch. The first is the expected current-account balance for this year. Large deficits need to be financed, but banking and portfolio inflows are now scarce, and even foreign direct investment, which used to be seen as less volatile, has fallen sharply this year. Many of the smaller east European economies had double-digit deficits as a share of GDP in 2008, although deep recessions will reduce them this year. Among the countries in the table, Pakistan, South Africa and Poland are tipped to run current-account deficits of 8% or more of GDP this year—the size of Thailand's deficit before its crisis in 1997.

我們的列表（基於匯豐銀行提供的大量數據）用了三個指標來判斷在全球信貸緊縮面前脆弱的經濟體是怎樣的情況。首先是今年的預計經常賬戶餘額。大量的赤字需要被注資，但是銀行和投資組合的流入現在很缺乏，甚至曾經很少變動的外國直接投資今年也急劇下降。很多更小的東歐經濟體在2008年的GDP比率中已經有兩位數的赤字，儘管嚴重的經濟衰退在今年會導致下降。在列表裡的這些國家中，巴基斯坦，南非和波蘭是典型的工業生產計劃運行機制，經常賬戶赤字達到今年GDP的8%甚至更多——這是泰國在1997年金融危機前的赤字規模。

As well as financing a current-account shortfall, a country has to repay or roll over existing debts. If external finance is not available, it must run down its reserves. Thus a useful measure of financing risk is short-term debt (due within 12 months) as a percentage of foreign-exchange reserves. Anything above 100%, implying that debts exceed foreign exchange, should ring alarm bells. (At the start of 1997 Thailand's short-term debt was 130% of its reserves.) The ratio is estimated at over 250% in both Latvia and Estonia, but in all the larger emerging economies it is below 100%. However, HSBC forecasts that South Korea's short-term debt will exceed its shrinking reserves before the year is out. The reserve cover in Indonesia, South Africa and Hungary is also looking thin. Russia's reserves have plunged by more than one-third as the central bank has tried to prop up the rouble, but it still has a comfortable cushion.
The third indicator, the ratio of banks' loans to their deposits, is one measure of the vulnerability of banking systems. When the ratio is over 1.0 (as in, say, Russia, Brazil, South Korea and Hungary), it means that the banks depend on borrowing, often from abroad, to finance domestic lending and so will be squeezed by the global credit crunch.

就像融資經常賬戶餘額一樣，一個國家必須償還或者滾動現有資產。如果外國資金不可靠，他就必須下調儲備。因此一個有用的措施來降低融資風險是將短期債務（在12個月以內）來作為外匯儲備的一部分。高於100%意味著債務超過了外匯，此時就當敲響警鐘了。（在1997年初的時候，泰國的短期貸款是儲備的130%）在拉脫維亞和愛沙尼亞這個比率估計都超過了250%，但是在所有更大的經濟體中是低於100%的。然而，匯豐銀行在今年數據公開之前預測韓國的短期債務會超過其收縮的儲備。這份儲備覆蓋了印度尼西亞，南非，並且匈牙利也逐漸緊縮。儘管俄國的儲備已經驟降了三分之一以上，但俄中央銀行嘗試著支撐盧布，它仍然還是有一個很好的靠墊的。第三個指標，銀行貸款和儲蓄的比率，是用來衡量銀行系統脆弱性的。但這個比率超過1.0時（據說在俄國，巴西，韓國和匈牙利），這意味著銀行依靠借款來充實本國貸款，這些借款通常來自於國外，因而在全球信貸緊縮的時候會有縮水。

To get an overall sense of financial vulnerability we have ranked all the countries on each of the three measures and then taken their average score. If all emerging economies were included, the smaller east Europeans, such as Latvia, Ukraine and Romania, would dominate the top of the risk league. Among the 17 larger economies shown in the table, South Africa and Hungary look the most risky; China the least. Hungary has already had to go cap in hand to the IMF for a loan. South Africa may yet have to. Despite higher gold prices, weaker mineral exports are causing its current-account deficit to swell, possibly to more than 10% of GDP this year, at the same time as net foreign direct investment is expected to slump, so the country needs to borrow even more. The rand, which has already fallen sharply, remains one of the most vulnerable emerging-market currencies.

為了全面的認識金融的脆弱，我們對所有國家在這三個標準下，每個依次進行排列然後取它們的平均數。如果所有的新型就那個集體都包括，在更小的東歐，像拉脫維亞，烏克蘭和羅馬尼亞在危機等級中處於前列。在列表中顯示的17個更大的經濟體中，南非和匈牙利處於最危機中；中國的危機最小。匈牙利已經不得不為IMF（國際貨幣基金組織）的貸款而畢恭畢敬。南非可能還沒有到這種程度。儘管增長的黃金價格和下降的的礦石出口導致他經常賬戶赤字的擴大，今年會達到GDP的１０％以上，同時，淨外國直接投資預計會大幅下降，因而這個國家需要借款更多。其中一個最脆弱的新興市場貨幣正處於急劇下降的邊緣。



Not again不要再來一次

In contrast, the Asian emerging markets generally look the safest, taking all six slots at the bottom of the table. The main exception is South Korea, which, thanks to its large short-term foreign debts and highly leveraged banks, is deemed to be as risky as Poland. (Vietnam, though not included in the table, also scores high on the risk rating). South Korea is in much healthier shape than during the 1997-98 crisis. For example, it is expected to move back to a small current-account surplus this year and its reserves are much larger. But its banks and its currency still look vulnerable. The won has already fallen by almost 40% against the dollar over the past year, swelling the local-currency value of its foreign debts. Increased financial jitters in east Europe could make it harder for South Korea to roll over the $194 billion debt which falls due this year. But currency-swap agreements with America, Japan and China will give it plenty of firepower to draw on.

相比之下，亞洲的新興市場大體上看起來是最安全的，佔據了列表底部的六個席位。一個很重要的例外是韓國，由於有大量的短期外債和高調控的銀行，被認為和波蘭處於同樣的風險。（越南，儘管不包括在列表中，仍然有高風險率）。比起１９９７－１９９８年的金融危機，韓國處於更好的狀況。例如，它今年有小額的經營賬戶盈餘，並且儲備也更龐大了。但是銀行和貨幣仍然看起來很脆弱。在過去的一年裡，韓元兌美元已經下降了將近４０％，本國貨幣對外債的價值增加了。在東歐增長的財政焦慮是韓國更加困難支付今年到期的１９４０億美元的債務。但是與美國，日本，中國達成的互惠外匯信貸協議將會給它帶來具有強大火力的鼓勵。

The overall score in the table only ranks countries' relative risks. To assess the absolute risk of a crisis you need to estimate external-financing needs (defined as the sum of the current-account balance and the stock of short-term debt) over the next 12 months. Jonathan Anderson, at UBS, has calculated the gap between this and the stock of foreign-exchange reserves for 45 countries. The good news is that only 16 of them have a financing 「gap」; in all the others, reserves are more than sufficient to cover a year's worth of payments, even if there were no new capital inflows. Virtually all of those 16 countries are in central and eastern Europe. They include only two large emerging economies from outside the region: Pakistan, which already has an IMF programme, and South Africa. By contrast, South Korea should not have a financing gap, thanks to its expected move back into current-account surplus. Most emerging economies' large reserves will help to keep them out of danger. Unfortunately, the longer that the credit crunch continues, the more those reserves will start to dwindle.

在列表的綜合分數中只是排列了國家的相對風險。為評定危機的絕對風險需要估計外部籌資需求（定義為經常賬戶餘額和股票短期借款的總和）在接下來的１２個月中。UBS（瑞士銀行）的Jonathan Anderson已經計算出４５個國家外匯股票儲備與這個的差距。好消息是只有１６個有融資「差距」；在其他的國家中，儘管沒有新的資金流入，但儲備還是可以充分支付一年的款項的。實際上所有這１６個國家都在中歐和東歐。他們只包括來自這個區域外的兩個大的經濟體：巴基斯坦和南非，已經有一個IMF計劃。相比之下，韓國本不該有一個融資差距，因為有經常賬戶的盈餘。大多數新興經濟體的高儲備會幫助他們處於危險之外。不幸的是，信貸緊縮持續的越久，更多的儲備會下降。

翻譯：ecocn team